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The Good, the Bad, and the Disparate 
ANALYZING FEDERAL SENTENCING IN THE 
BORDER DISTRICTS, 1996-2008 
INTRODUCTION 
The escalating violence along the United States’ border 
with Mexico could be likened to the days of the “Old West”: 
grenades rolling into saloons, bullets fired into city halls, 
violent assassinations.1 Unlike the days of the “Old West,” 
however, constitutional protections now take the place of hired 
guns. Rather than vigilante justice meted out by the luck of the 
draw, federal courts provide offenders charged along the border 
with the promise of certainty and fairness. 
Offenders in the federal districts along the border need 
not fear the arbitrary possibility of death from a heavy trigger 
finger—the federal sentencing system was designed to provide 
“certainty and fairness” by avoiding “unwarranted disparity 
among offenders with similar characteristics convicted of 
similar criminal conduct.”2 In theory, this uniform sentencing 
system ensures that similar offenders are sentenced in similar 
ways.3 However, given the intense pressures on law 
enforcement and courts and the sometimes war-like state of 
unrest in the border states, the risk seems real that the 
certainty and fairness of the system might give way to chaos—
or at least disparity. 
This note undertakes an empirical analysis of United 
States Sentencing Guidelines data from the border districts from 
1996-2008. This note’s analysis assumes that the border districts 
are facing one overarching problem: heightened federal crime 
  
 1 On August 9, 2010, Texas Governor Rick Perry gave President Barack 
Obama a letter describing such incidents as examples of the “dire threat amassing on our 
southern border” and asking for increased federal resources along the border. Letter from 
Rick Perry, Governor of Tex., to Barack Obama, President of the U.S. (Aug. 9, 2010), 
available at http://governor.state.tx.us/files/press-office/080910_PerryObamaletter.pdf. 
 2 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMMISSION (2010), available at http://www.ussc.gov/About_the_ 
Commission/Overview_of_the_USSC/USSC_Overview.pdf. 
 3 See id. 
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related to activities along the United States’ border with Mexico. 
Operating on this assumption, this note analyzes two aspects of 
border district sentencing—fast-track motions4 and substantial 
assistance motions5—to determine whether the districts are 
dealing with their unifying problem in the same ways. This 
analysis focuses on these two particular sentencing motions 
because of the way they relate to the border districts: substantial 
assistance motions are used less frequently in the border 
districts than in the rest of the federal districts,6 and fast-track 
motions originated in the border districts as a mechanism for 
prosecutors to deal with heavy caseloads.7 
Part I of this note gives context for a discussion of the 
border districts and their sentencing practices in the last 
several years. Section A introduces the five federal districts 
along the U.S.-Mexico border and describes the growth of their 
dockets over the last twelve years. This section discusses the 
reasons for this growth, namely the increased law enforcement 
efforts on the border and increased volume of federal 
immigration offenders charged in the five districts. Section B 
explains changes to the sentencing systems in the five border 
districts, including the development of fast-track programs and 
changes in the applicability of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines. Part I concludes by explaining the source of the 
data used for this note’s analysis and defining key terms. 
Parts II and III of this note each analyze an aspect of 
border district sentencing to look for trends or disparities, and to 
determine whether such trends or disparities are justified or 
unjustified. Part II analyzes rates of fast-track motions in the 
border districts in years 2005-2008—concluding that the border 
districts are using fast-track motions at different rates—and 
theorizes that this disparity can be attributed to differing 
prosecutorial practices in the districts. Part III analyzes rates of 
substantial assistance motions in the border districts in years 
1996-2008 and reveals that the districts have converged around a 
  
 4 The term “fast-track motion” is used in this note to refer to motions 
currently made under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) section 5k3.1 
for a downward departure in a defendant’s sentence based on his agreement to 
expedited and truncated proceedings. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the 
development and use of these motions in the border districts. 
 5 The term “substantial assistance motion” is used in this note to refer to 
motions made under U.S.S.G. section 5k1.1 for a downward departure in a defendant’s 
sentence based on his cooperation with the government. See infra Part I.B.1 for a 
discussion of these motions. 
 6 See infra Part III.A. 
 7 See infra Part I.B.1. 
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trend of low rates of substantial assistance motions. Part III also 
examines the possible reasons for this trend and theorizes that 
there are correlations between rates of substantial assistance 
motions and variables such as the citizenship of offenders on the 
docket and the use of fast-track sentencing in the districts. 
This note contributes to literature on sentencing 
disparities in the national context8 by examining a group of 
federal districts dealing with an overwhelming localized crime 
problem—illegal immigration and drug activities along the 
U.S.-Mexico border—in order to see whether the chaos of the 
region has permeated the uniform federal sentencing scheme. 
This note’s analysis shows that, while the border districts are 
dealing with their unifying problem in similar ways in one 
respect (decreasing rates of substantial assistance motions), 
they are unjustifiably disparate in their use of fast-track 
motions. This note concludes that these decreased rates of 
substantial assistance motions and disparate use of fast-track 
motions suggest that prosecutors in the border districts are 
sacrificing goals of uniformity and thorough law enforcement in 
favor of expedient processing. 
  
 8 Sentencing scholars have discussed many aspects of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. For a discussion of the history and policy strategies motivating 
the creation of the Guidelines, see Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1988) 
(explaining the purposes, creation, and key motivations behind the guidelines). For 
criticisms of the Guidelines as allowing too much prosecutorial discretion or creating 
unwarranted sentencing disparities, see Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for 
Snitches, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 600-21 (1999) (explaining the difficulty in quantifying 
the impact of differing prosecutorial policies on substantial assistance motions, the 
most common form of downward departure under the federal sentencing guidelines, 
and presenting the varying rates of substantial assistance sentencing over the federal 
districts), and Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 137 (2005) (discussing several sources of variation in sentencing under 
the federal sentencing guidelines and whether or not they are justified). For examples 
of other empirical analyses of sentencing, see Linda Drazga Maxfield & Keri 
Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry: Is Federal Practice 
Comparable Across Districts?, 14 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (2002) [hereinafter 
Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry] (an empirical 
analysis of unlawful reentry sentences across offenders and districts); Linda Drazga 
Maxfield & John H. Kramer, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN 
EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 2-
4 (1998) [hereinafter Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK], available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf (explaining the origin and mechanics of section 5k1.1 
“substantial assistance” motions); and Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges 
Changed Their Sentencing Practices?: The Shaky Empirical Foundations of the Feeney 
Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 24-35 (2005) (an empirical analysis 
examining the impact of judicial discretion and other factors on sentences). 
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE BORDER DISTRICTS AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING IN THE BORDER DISTRICTS 
The federal district courts along the border between the 
United States and Mexico are no strangers to policy shifts, 
precedent upsets, and high-volume, fast-paced prosecutions. In 
the mid-1990s, national attention and increased law 
enforcement efforts along the U.S.-Mexico border led to an 
“exploding volume” of immigration-related cases.9 As a result, 
the federal district courts experienced not only an increase in 
their dockets but also national pressure to continue disposition 
of cases at expeditious rates.10 This Part gives an overview of 
the events impacting sentencing in the border districts, both 
within the region and nationally. 
A. Growth of the Border District Criminal Dockets, 1996-2008 
There are five federal districts along the U.S.-Mexico 
border: the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, the 
Southern District of California, the Southern District of Texas, 
and the Western District of Texas.11 The Southern District of 
California and the District of New Mexico are in the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, while Arizona is in the Tenth 
Circuit, and the Texas districts are in the Fifth Circuit.12 Each 
district has a United States Attorney assigned to prosecute 
federal criminal offenses in the district.13 
According to the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s published data, all five border districts 
experienced a notable general increase in the percent of 
immigration offenders14 comprising their total dockets between 
  
 9 Thomas E. Gorman, A History of Fast-Track Sentencing, 21 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 311, 311 (2009). 
 10 Id. 
 11 Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United 
States District Courts, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/Circuit 
Map.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 12 Id. 
 13 United States Attorneys’ Mission Statement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/offices/mission.html (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
 14 Data by offense type (i.e. “immigration offenders”) represents the Sentencing 
Commission’s representation of the offender’s “primary offense category,” obtained from 
the Judgment of Conviction Order. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF 
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 2008 app. A (2009) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK 
APPENDIX], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/appendix_A.pdf. The 
“primary offense category” is the offense code applicable to the conviction on the charge 
carrying the highest statutory maximum sentence. Id. Information on “immigration 
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1996 and 2008.15 The United States as a whole also experienced 
an overall increase in federal immigration cases,16 due largely 
to the increased volume of immigration offenders in the border 
districts.17 This increase has been the subject of national 
attention from high-level government officials and the press.18 
  
offenders” represents offenders whose primary offense was “trafficking in U.S. 
passports; trafficking in entry documents; failure to surrender naturalization 
certificate; fraudulently acquiring entry documents; smuggling, etc.; unlawful alien; 
fraudulently acquiring entry documents; and unlawfully entering U.S.” Id. 
 15 See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (2009) [hereinafter 2008 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/SBTOC08.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2008) [hereinafter 2007 
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/ 
SBTOC07.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (2007) [hereinafter 2006 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/SBTOC06.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2005 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2006) [hereinafter 2005 
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/ 
SBTOC05.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (2005) [hereinafter 2004 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/SBTOC04.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2003 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2004) [hereinafter 2003 
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2003/ 
SBTOC03.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (2003) [hereinafter 2002 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/SBTOC02.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2002) [hereinafter 2001 
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/ 
SBTOC01.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (2001) [hereinafter 2000 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/SBTOC00.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1999 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2000) [hereinafter 1999 
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/ 
Sbtoc99.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (1999) [hereinafter 1998 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1998/Sbtoc98.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1997 
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (1998) [hereinafter 1997 
SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/ 
sbtoc97.htm; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS app. B (1997) [hereinafter 1996 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/sourcbk.htm; [collectively, hereinafter SENTENCING 
COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008] (showing an increase over the years in the number of 
immigration offenders in the districts in relation to total offenders sentenced in the 
districts). 
 16 The percentage of immigration offenses of the national total rose steadily 
from 11.6% in 1996 to 28% in 2008. See SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, 
supra note 15. 
 17 Gorman, supra note 9, at 311. 
 18 See, e.g., President William Clinton, Remarks on Immigration Policy (July 
27, 1993), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1584/is_n32_v4/ai_13263265 
(beginning the outline of his new immigration policy by explaining that he was “especially 
concerned about the growing problems of alien smuggling and international terrorists 
hiding behind immigrant status, as well as the continuing flow of illegal immigrants 
across American borders”); Jim Yardley, Expanded Border Policing Clogs the Courts and 
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In fact, President Barack Obama recently signed a $600 million 
bill to increase border surveillance and the number of federal 
agents along the border.19 
Of the five border districts, the District of New Mexico 
and the Southern District of Texas experienced the sharpest 
increases in federal immigration offenders. The percent of the 
total docket composed of immigration offenders in the District of 
New Mexico rose from 26% in 1996 to 70% in 2008,20 and the 
Southern District of Texas similarly rose from 27% to 72% 
immigration offenders.21 The other three districts similarly 
experienced large increases in the percentage of immigration 
offenders on their criminal dockets.22 
Not all immigration offenders are charged in federal 
court. Federal prosecutors have general discretion whether to 
prosecute referrals from federal law enforcement agencies.23 
Immigration offenses, which “rang[e] from a noncitizen seeking 
to enter the country illegally, to a legal immigrant overstaying 
a visa permit, to organized criminal efforts to produce 
counterfeit social security cards,”24 not only violate federal 
criminal law, but violate administrative regulations and 
implicate civil law as well.25 Roughly 80% of immigration 
matters are handled in administrative proceedings.26 
Many of the immigration offenders in the border 
districts are Mexican citizens crossing the border without legal 
  
Jails, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2000, at A7 (discussing the increased law enforcement efforts 
along the border and the consequent shortages in local and federal resources to deal with 
the offenders). 
 19 Julia Preston, Obama Signs Border Bill to Increase Surveillance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, at A10. 
 20 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15. 
 21 Id. 
 22 The other three districts rose as follows: the District of Arizona from 33.5% 
to 57.9%, the Southern District of California from 45.5% to 61.5%, and the Western 
District of Texas from 32.3% to 47%. Id. 
 23 Dorie Apollonio et al., An Analysis of Federal Immigration Prosecutions 4, 
prepared for presentation at the Midwest Political Science Association annual meeting, 
Apr. 2-5, 2009 (Chicago, Ill.), available at http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_ 
apa_research_citation/3/6/1/2/0/pages361209/p361209-4.php. Prosecutorial discretion 
on whether to prosecute immigration offenses is outside the scope of this note. This 
note concerns disparities in sentencing resulting from practices undertaken only after 
the decision to bring federal charges has been made. 
 24 Id. at 5-6. 
 25 Id. at 6 (discussing the fact that most immigration offenses used to be 
administrative offenses until Congress expanded the scope of immigration law). 
 26 Surge in Immigration Prosecutions Continues, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS 
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (June 17, 2008), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/188. 
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authorization to do so.27 Increased law enforcement efforts at 
the border have caused increased use of “coyotes,” or 
professional smugglers who collect a stiff fee to assist in illegal 
border crossings.28 Drug trafficking across the border is another 
common immigration-related offense.29 In fact, national 
policymakers recognize drug trafficking across the U.S.-Mexico 
border as a severe and persistent problem, leading to 
escalating violence in both countries.30 Top officials in the 
border states have declared states of emergency several times 
in the last decade due to escalating violence relating to drug 
cartel activities along the border.31 
The percent rise in immigration cases came at the same 
time as an increase in the size of the criminal dockets of each 
district.32 In 1996, the District of New Mexico sentenced 613 
criminal defendants, and in 2008 it sentenced almost 300033—
meaning that its criminal docket more than quadrupled. The 
Western District of Texas nearly quadrupled the number of 
defendants sentenced between 1996 and 2008, growing from 
only 1912 criminal offenders sentenced in 1996 to 7233 
sentenced in 2008.34 
The growth of the border district criminal dockets was 
primarily due to increased law enforcement activities along the 
border, which led to increased immigration arrests and 
prosecutions.35 In the 1990s, law enforcement agencies received 
increased funding and federal lawmakers expanded the 
  
 27 Illegal Immigration from Mexico, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT, http://www. 
usimmigrationsupport.org/illegal_immigration_mexico.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Spencer S. Hsu & Joby Warrick, U.S. Stepping Up Response to Mexican Drug 
Violence, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032401155.html. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Law Causes Split for Border Governors, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 6, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/07/us/07 
governors.html. 
 32 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15. Although the 
four other border districts experienced overall growth between 1996 and 2008, the 
Southern District of California alone experienced a period of decline in docket size 
between 2002 and 2005. Id. The reasons for this decline not related to the disparities 
discussed herein are outside the scope of this note. For a discussion of the low number of 
prosecutions in several offense areas and the forced resignation of Carol Lam, the United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of California, see Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking 
the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 378-80 (2009). 
 33 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Gorman, supra note 9, at 311. 
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applicability of federal immigration offenses.36 The increase in 
the size of the border districts’ criminal dockets came at the 
same time as other significant changes in sentencing. The next 
section discusses changes in sentencing policy that occurred in 
the border districts and nationally. 
B. Changes in Border District Sentencing: Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and Fast-Track Programs 
Although they are often discussed as a singular region,37 
the border districts are governed by the same sentencing scheme 
as the other eighty-nine districts in the federal judiciary: the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“the Guidelines”).38 The 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States 
Sentencing Commission, an independent agency within the 
judicial branch, to devise and promulgate federal sentencing 
guidelines.39 The Guidelines went into effect in 198740 and were 
found by the Supreme Court to be a constitutional delegation of 
Congressional authority to the judiciary.41 
The Guidelines were designed to “provide certainty and 
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing by avoiding 
unwarranted disparity among offenders with similar 
characteristics convicted of similar criminal conduct.”42 The 
Guidelines provide a framework for calculating the sentencing 
range for a defendant.43 First, each offense in the conviction or 
plea correlates to a base-level point assignment.44 The base-
level point assignment can be increased or decreased based on 
the breadth and severity of the criminal conduct, the 
defendant’s criminal record, and certain heightening or 
mitigating circumstances of the criminal conduct.45 The 
Guidelines also provide for downward and upward departures 
  
 36 Id. 
 37 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 145-46; Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 24-35. 
 38 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING 
COMMISSION (2009) [hereinafter SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW], available at http://www. 
ussc.gov/general/USSC_Overview_200906.pdf. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 2. 
 41 United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989) (finding that, although 
the Sentencing Commission was an “unusual hybrid in structure and authority,” its 
creation did not violate the non-delegation doctrine nor separation of powers). 
 42 SENTENCING COMM’N OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 1. 
 43 Id. at 2-3. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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from the calculated sentencing range based on factors relating 
to the defendant’s criminal proceedings.46 The final point 
calculation corresponds to a range of months for the 
defendant’s sentence.47 
1. Substantial Assistance Departures and Fast-Track 
Sentencing 
The two types of downward departures examined in this 
note—fast-track motions and substantial assistance motions—
are notable because of their relationship to the border districts: 
fast-track motions originated in the border districts and are 
considered mainly a border district phenomenon, and the 
border districts generally employ a much lower rate of 
substantial assistance motions than most of the other federal 
districts.48 These two downward departures are based on 
government motions to lower a defendant’s sentence due to 
some benefit received by the government in the course of the 
defendant’s proceedings: fast-track motions reflect the 
government’s benefit from a defendant’s agreement to 
expedited and truncated proceedings, and substantial 
assistance motions reflect the government’s benefit from a 
defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement investigations or 
prosecutions of other individuals. 
Substantial assistance motions are the older and more 
widely-used of the two downward departures discussed in this 
note.49 Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the 
government can make a motion under U.S.S.G. § 5k1.150 for a 
downward departure for “substantial assistance.”51 These 
motions, also known as “5k1.1” motions, are motions where the 
  
 46 Id. at 3. 
 47 Id. As explained later in this Part, the final Guidelines range used to be 
binding upon the sentencing court. Id. at 2. However, after United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220 (2005), the Guidelines are merely advisory, rather than mandatory. Id. 
 48 See infra Part III.A. 
 49 Substantial assistance motions are motions within the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines and can be used in any federal district. See Maxfield, EMPIRICAL 
YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 2. In contrast, fast-track motions can only be used in 
certain districts experiencing high volumes of certain types of offenders. See infra note 
61 and accompanying text.  
 50 United States Sentencing Guidelines [U.S.S.G.] § 5k1.1 (1994) (“Upon 
motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an 
offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.”). 
 51 See Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 3-4 (explaining the 
origin and mechanics of section 5k1.1 “substantial assistance” motions). 
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government essentially “pays” a defendant for his cooperation in 
a criminal investigation by requesting a reduction in his 
sentence.52 The amount of cooperation necessary to receive such 
a motion may vary among U.S. Attorney’s offices.53 The potential 
for sentencing disparities due to differing use of substantial 
assistance motions has been the subject of significant scholarly 
debate since the creation of the Guidelines.54 
Compared to substantial assistance motions, fast-track 
motions are a recent and even more controversial phenomenon. 
The rise in the number of immigration offenders and growth in 
the overall dockets in the border districts in the mid-1990s caused 
federal prosecutors to look for ways within the Guidelines to 
process the ever-heavier caseloads.55 Prosecutors began asking for 
shorter sentences for defendants who would agree to plead guilty 
at an early stage in the criminal proceedings.56 
At first these motions were made ad hoc.57 Prosecutors 
in the Southern District of California began using an informal 
program in 1994, asking for lower sentences in exchange for a 
defendant’s agreement to a speedy disposition of his case.58 
Although the early disposition program originated solely from 
continued use by prosecutors and the acquiescence of the 
district courts, the Ninth Circuit officially approved the 
programs in 1995.59 
Other districts developed similar programs, and the 
federal circuit courts upheld the programs against constitutional 
challenges brought under equal protection, due process, and the 
Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.60 Districts in other 
  
 52 Miriam H. Baer, Cooperation’s Cost, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). 
 53 Bibas, supra note 8, at 151. 
 54 See, e.g., Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 5 (examining 
trends in substantial assistance departures in the first years of the guidelines); Bibas, 
supra note 8, at 146-47 (arguing that substantial assistance motions are a source of 
significant disparities). 
 55 Gorman, supra note 9, at 311-12. 
 56 Id. at 311. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Testimony of Judge Marilyn L. Huff, Southern District of California, to the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Concerning Fast-Track or Early Disposition Programs 1-
2 (Sept. 23, 2003), available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/hearings/9_23_03/Huff.pdf. Judge 
Huff explained that the fast-track program mainly addressed reentry after deportation 
offenders in the District. Judge Huff also listed shortage of resources to house pretrial 
defendants, marshal shortages, and inability to meet vast interpreter needs. Id. at 2-3.  
 59 United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 761 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 60 See Gorman, supra note 9, at 312 (listing the cases upholding the 
constitutionality of early fast-track programs). In United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 
633 (2002), the Supreme Court found that a defendant’s guilty plea taken without 
being informed of a potential later right to impeachment information did not violate 
 
2011] THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE DISPARATE 877 
regions of the country currently use fast-track programs.61 
However, the ad hoc “early disposition programs” originated in 
the border districts and sentencing literature often refers to 
them as a border district phenomenon.62 
Fast-track programs gained official sanction in 2003.63 
After reviewing sentencing reports, federal legislators worried 
that judicial discretion to use speedy disposition to depart 
below the Guidelines ranges had grown to unacceptable rates.64 
To remedy the perceived problem, Congress added the Feeney 
Amendment to the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against 
the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (the PROTECT 
Act).65 The PROTECT Act was an omnibus crime control act 
which, among other things, created the AMBER Alert system 
and made changes to the federal criminal code and United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.66 The Feeney Amendment 
required the Sentencing Commission to limit judicial discretion 
in sentencing, including limits to downward departures under 
the then-mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.67 By 
  
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The Ruiz court noted that fast-track dispositions 
require defendants to waive the right to receive any information from the Government 
on affirmative defenses to be used at trial, and that this practice is constitutional. Id. 
In United States v. Estrada-Plata, 57 F.3d 757, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995), the case where 
the Ninth Circuit approved the early disposition practice of the Southern District of 
California, the court noted that the program satisfied Eighth Amendment concerns 
because the defendant’s sentence was not so “‘grossly out of proportion to the severity 
of the crime as to shock our sense of justice.’” (quoting United States v. Cupa-Guillen, 
34 F.3d 860, 864 (9th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, the Estrada-Plata court found due process 
arguments against the fast-track sentence to be frivolous, because under the same logic 
all mandatory minimums and sentencing enhancements would also violate due process. 
Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 623. The Ninth Circuit has also ruled en banc that fast-track programs 
do not violate equal protection. In United States v. Banuelos-Rodriguez, 215 F.3d 969 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc), the court emphasized the lack of any evidence of racial animosity 
motivating the fast-track programs. Although the defendant argued that prosecutors 
maintained the discretion not to “give” fast-track sentences to defendants of different 
nationalities, the court admonished that defendant’s argument should “be made to the 
executive, not the judicial, branch.” Id. at 977. 
 61 Memorandum from Craig Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Regarding Reauthorization of Early Disposition Programs (Feb. 1, 2008) 
[hereinafter Morford Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 318, 330-32 (2009). 
Districts in Florida, New York, Idaho, Kansas, Utah, Nebraska, Georgia, Oregon, Puerto 
Rico, and Washington have been authorized for fast-track programs. Id. at 331-32. 
 62 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 146-47 (referring to justifications of border 
district fast-track programs, and arguing that they cause disparities between border 
districts and districts in other regions). 
 63 Gorman, supra note 9, at 312. 
 64 Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 12-13.  
 65 Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 66 Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
 67 Id.; see also Gorman, supra note 9, at 312. 
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legitimizing the fast-track programs, legislators hoped to 
control their use and impact.68 
The Guidelines amended pursuant to the Feeney 
Amendment provide that when a defendant has participated in 
an expedited plea and sentencing program, the government will 
make a motion for downward departure known as a “fast-track 
motion,”69 or a “5k3.1 motion.”70 The Sentencing Commission 
reports participation in fast-track programs by reporting the 
number of cases in which the government made a 5k3.1 motion.71 
The Commission data on fast-track departures includes 
departures for all offense types authorized to have fast-track 
programs—in the border districts, the offenses authorized for 
fast-track programs are all immigration and drug offenses.72 
After the Feeney Amendment became law, the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) promulgated rules and reporting 
criteria for the newly legitimized fast-track programs under the 
Guidelines.73 Under the DOJ’s framework, federal prosecutors 
have the option to move for a downward departure of a 
specified number of levels in the Guidelines in exchange for a 
defendant’s expedited plea.74 In addition to pleading to the 
offense, a fast-track plea must contain the defendant’s 
acknowledgement of conduct constituting the charged offense, 
agreement not to file any Rule 12(b)(3) motions,75 agreement to 
waive appeal, and agreement to waive the opportunity to 
challenge the conviction by collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. 
  
 68 See Thomas E. Gorman, Note, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading 
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479 [hereinafter 
Gorman, Rereading Congressional Intent] (discussing the legislative history of the 
Feeney Amendment and the stated goals of the legislators responsible for its passage). 
 69 Downward departures are a decrease in the calculated Guidelines 
sentence, after the defendant’s Guidelines sentence range has been calculated from 
his/her offense and criminal history. See supra Part I.B. 
 70 U.S.S.G. § 5k3.1 (“Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart 
downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized 
by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the 
district in which the court resides.”). This analysis refers to 5k3.1 motions as “fast-
track motions.” 
 71 SOURCEBOOK APPENDIX, supra note 14. 
 72 See supra Part I.B. 
 73 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Setting 
Forth Justice Department’s Sentencing Policies (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter Ashcroft 
Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 318 (2009). 
 74 Id. at 319-20. 
 75 Motions under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 12(b)(3) must 
be made before trial. These motions include motions alleging a defect in instituting the 
prosecution, alleging a defect in an indictment, or motions to suppress evidence. FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3). 
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§ 2255.76 Although U.S. Attorney’s offices employing the fast-
track programs may determine how many levels of departure a 
fast-track plea merits, departures cannot be for more than four 
levels.77 
In the first official authorization of fast-track programs, 
the DOJ authorized all five of the border districts to use fast-
track programs for the offenses of illegal entry after 
deportation and transportation or harboring of illegal 
immigrants.78 The District of Arizona was additionally 
authorized to use fast-track motions for the offenses of 
alien/baby smuggling79 and first-time petty marijuana offenses 
along the border.80 Between 2003 and 2008, the DOJ 
periodically reauthorized the districts for the same programs.81 
In 2009, Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden 
reminded districts that reapproval of fast-track programs 
depends on “demonstrable results establishing that the 
authorized early disposition program is permitting the 
prosecution of a significantly larger number of defendants . . . 
than would occur if the program was discontinued.”82 Ogden’s 
memorandum underscores the original intent of fast-track 
programs: to equip districts to handle more cases.83 
2. Changes in the Applicability of the Guidelines 
In addition to the development of new sentencing 
practices within the United States Sentencing Guidelines, 
changes between 2004 and 2008 in the applicability of the 
  
 76 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 73, at 319-20. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2006), a 
federal prisoner would normally be able to petition for habeas corpus relief by asking the 
court that imposed the sentence to “vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 
 77 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 73, at 320. 
 78 Both of these offenses are considered “[i]mmigration” offenses. 
Memorandum from James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to U.S. 
Attorneys on Authorization of Early Disposition Programs (Oct. 29, 2004) [hereinafter 
Comey Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 322, 323 (2009). 
 79 Baby smuggling has cropped up in several of the border districts. 
Smugglers bring babies born in other countries (usually Mexico) over the border to be 
adopted in the U.S. Sentences Handed Down in Baby Smuggling Case, VISALAW.COM 
(Apr. 4, 2000), http://www.visalaw.com/00apr4/18apr400.html. 
 80 Comey Memo, supra note 78. 
 81 Id.; Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
to U.S. Attorneys on Reauthorization of Early Disposition Programs (Mar. 19, 2007) 
[hereinafter McNulty Memo], reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 325 (2009). 
 82 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to U.S. Attorneys on Authorization for Early Disposition Programs (Mar. 29, 
2009), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT’G REP. 337, 338 (2009). 
 83 Gorman, supra note 9, at 311. 
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Guidelines impacted sentencing in all federal districts. In 2004, 
the Supreme Court ruled in Blakely v. Washington84 that a 
state determinate sentencing scheme allowing a judicial 
finding to increase the maximum allowable sentence for a 
defendant was unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment’s 
requirement of a jury trial.85 In 2005, the Supreme Court ruled 
in United States v. Booker86 that the Sixth Amendment’s 
requirement of a jury trial for any element of a crime 
heightening the maximum allowable sentence was 
incompatible with mandatory application of the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, and therefore the Guidelines must be 
merely advisory, rather than mandatory.87 
Changes to the applicability of the Guidelines impacted 
the use of substantial assistance departures and fast-track 
departures. Booker’s holding arguably “undid the Feeney 
Amendment, [and] limited the power that inheres in 
prosecutors in a regime of mandatory sentencing rules.”88 The 
Feeney Amendment set forth rigid confines for judicial 
departures, but the entire system became advisory under 
Booker. The shift from prosecutorial power to judicial power 
occurred because, rather than being limited to departures 
when the government has motioned for them (under the 
mandatory guidelines system), the advisory system allows 
judges to give lower sentences without government motion. 
Some sentencing scholars question whether defendants 
still have an incentive to cooperate after Booker.89 Motions for 
downward departure due to substantial assistance or 
participation in a fast-track program remain on the books as an 
important aspect of calculating a defendant’s Guidelines range 
to assist the court in sentencing. However, unless the 
  
 84 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004). Blakely’s holding came on the tail of the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), which held 
that the Sixth Amendment’s jury requirement applies to any factors (other than prior 
convictions) that increase the penalty for a crime beyond a statutory maximum. 530 
U.S. at 476-77. 
 85 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313-14. 
 86 543 U.S. 220, 233-34 (2005). 
 87 Id. 
 88 Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise 
of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1426 (2008). 
 89 Doug Berman, What of Substantial Assistance?, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y 
(Jan. 13, 2005, 11:02 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/ 
2005/01/what_of_substan.html. 
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defendant faces a statutory mandatory minimum,90 a 
government motion is no longer a necessary element for a judge 
to depart downward. 
C. Data Analysis: Methods and Key Terms 
The United States Sentencing Commission publishes 
sentencing data in the Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing 
Statistics, which accompanies the Commission’s Annual Report 
for each fiscal year.91 In 2004, the Sentencing Commission 
issued the data in two separate forms: pre- and post-Blakely.92 
In 2005, the Sentencing Commission again issued the data in 
two separate forms: pre- and post-Booker.93 Rather than divide 
each year into two data points for analysis, this note combines 
the pre- and post-data for each year into one overall data figure 
for the year by calculating a weighted average94 of the two sets. 
Scholars have used several methods for analyzing 
sentencing disparities and evaluating the reasons for them.95 
This note analyzes two aspects of sentencing in the border 
  
 90 See Baer, supra note 52, at 2 n.3 (describing the implications of a 
defendant’s conviction for an offense carrying a statutory minimum, and the inability 
of a sentencing judge to depart downward without a government motion). 
 91 Each fiscal year represents the sentencing data for offenders sentenced 
between October 1 and September 30 of the following year. 2008 SENTENCING COMM’N 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15, at introduction. The Sourcebooks are available online, 
published by year, and contain appendices with sentencing data broken down by 
district. Annual Reports & Statistical Sourcebooks, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
available at http://ftp.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2011). 
 92 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding that a judicial finding increasing the 
maximum allowable sentence for a crime violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial). The two data sets denoted sentencing data before and after the opinion. 
 93 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that in order to be constitutional under the Sixth 
Amendment, the United States Sentencing Guidelines must be advisory, not mandatory). 
 94 Calculating a weighted average ensures that “quantities being averaged [are 
given] their proper degree of importance.” JOHN E. FREUND, MODERN ELEMENTARY 
STATISTICS 54 (10th ed. 2001). For example, an analysis merely averaging the pre- and post-
Booker data sets would not take into account the different periods of time the two data sets 
represent. Here, the weighted averages were calculated by multiplying each x (data point for 
which a full year total needed to be calculated) by the proportion of the total data (x/the sum 
of the pre-and post-data) it represented before figuring it into the average. 
 95 See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity and 
Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921 (2002) (analyzing district 
disparities in use of substantial assistance motions in drug cases by looking at percent 
of drug offenders receiving substantial assistance motions in “high cooperation” 
districts and “low cooperation” districts, and comparing the respective proportions of 
drug trafficking offenses within the districts’ total dockets); Schanzenbach, supra note 
8, at 1 (Schanzenbach ran a detailed statistical analysis of departure rates between 
1993 and 2001. He found that, though at first glance rates of cooperation increased 
between 1993 and 2001, analysis controlling for variables such as characteristics of the 
crime and offender reveals that the actual increase was minimal.). 
882 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:2 
districts—fast-track sentencing and substantial assistance 
departures—in three steps. First, this note looks at the 
sentencing data in the border districts and looks for patterns or 
disparities among the districts in order to ascertain whether 
the districts seem to be using the motions in similar ways. 
Second, this note theorizes possible explanations for the 
patterns or disparities, based on factors such as sentence 
composition,96 prosecutorial practices, or the characteristics of 
the offenders on the district dockets. This second step of 
analysis will also examine connections between the rates of the 
two motions in the individual districts. 
Third, this note uses Professor Stephanos Bibas’s 
framework for analyzing sentencing disparities to theorize 
about whether the disparities seem justified or unjustified. 
Under Bibas’s framework, a disparity is presumptively 
justifiable if it “correlate[s] closely with temporary, localized 
crime problems.”97 A sentencing disparity is unjustifiable if it is 
“unrelated to local crime problems or . . . track[s] legally 
irrelevant factors.”98 Bibas’s framework is based on the notion 
that district-level disagreements about policy or value are 
unjustified sources of disparity, while responses to special 
problems within the districts are justified sources of disparity.99 
Each district has different judges and courthouse 
cultures, a different U.S. Attorney, and specialized local needs. 
However, the border districts’ heavy immigration-related 
criminal caseloads set them apart from the other federal 
districts and unite them as a unique bloc within the federal 
courts.100 This note’s analysis operates on the assumption that 
the districts share a “local crime problem”: significant law 
enforcement efforts on the border leading to a heavy volume of 
immigration offenders on their criminal dockets. The next two 
sections will look at whether the border districts are using 
  
 96 Scholars often use composition of offenses as a statistical factor to find 
correlations between how pervasive an offense is on a district’s docket, and how that 
corresponds (or does not correspond) to rates of downward departure motions or 
sentencing practices. See, e.g., Simons, supra note 95, at 949 (“The volume of drug 
cases in a particular district does not explain the variation . . . .”); Frank O. Bowman, 
III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analysis of Declining Federal 
Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 477, 487 (2002) 
(describing these scholars’ previous analysis of changes in proportion of drug type 
prosecuted in federal courts). 
 97 Bibas, supra note 8, at 141. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See supra Part I.A. 
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similar methods to deal with the heavy task of implementing 
national policy goals in local federal courts.  
II. ANALYSIS OF FAST-TRACK SENTENCING, 2005-2008 
According to sentencing scholar Doug Berman, fast-
track disparity is a persistent “hot-spot” in post-Booker 
jurisprudence.101 The disparity Berman refers to, however, 
stems from sentencing arguments that “defendants who are not 
within so-called ‘fast-track’ districts should be eligible for 
comparable early plea reductions” when their situations are 
similar to defendants who would get the fast-track reductions 
in districts using fast-track programs.102 This note reveals 
another type of disparity: disparity in how frequently fast-track 
districts are using fast-track motions in sentencing. 
This Part analyzes fast-track sentencing for the years 
2005-2008 by looking at the rates of fast-track motions103 in 
each of the five districts. The first step in the analysis 
identifies significant disparities among the border districts in 
their use of fast-track motions. The second step in the analysis 
discusses possible reasons for the disparities and adopts the 
conclusion that differing prosecutorial practices, such as the 
use of charge bargaining,104 are the most likely reason for the 
disparities. This Part concludes that the disparate use of fast-
track sentencing prevents fast-track programs from achieving 
the goals that originally justified their creation. 
  
 101 Doug Berman, The Persistent Problems with Fast-Track Disparity After Booker 
and Kimbrough, SENT’G L. & POL’Y (Feb. 11, 2009, 9:41 AM), http://sentencing.typepad. 
com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2009/02/the-persistent-problems-with-fasttrack-disparity-
after-booker-and-kimbrough.html. 
 102 Id. 
 103 For a discussion of the history of fast-track sentencing and the 
requirements for a fast-track sentence, see supra Part I.B.1.  
 104 Charge bargaining, as discussed by sentencing scholars, is the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion to charge a lower crime in exchange for something given up by 
the offender. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 146 n.30 (explaining different means for 
prosecutors to exercise discretion in charging and sentencing in the fast-track context, 
and citing to a study where charge bargaining led to higher processing of cases in a 
district) (citing William Braniff, Local Discretion, Prosecutorial Choice and the 
Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 310-11 (1993)). 
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A. Step 1: Disparate Use of Fast-Track Motions in the Five 
Border Districts 
The sentencing data on fast-track motions since 2005105 
reveals substantial disparity among the districts in their use of 
fast-track motions.106 To compare the districts’ use of fast-track 
motions, this note compares the rates of fast-track motions in 
each district: the percent of offenders—out of total offenders 
sentenced—receiving a fast-track motion in each border district 
in each year 2005-2008.107 Figure 1 shows the rate of fast-track 
motions per year in each of the five border districts for the 
years 2005-2008. In 2008, 5 out of 10 defendants in the District 
of Arizona received a downward departure due to participation 
in a fast-track program, compared to about 3 of 10 defendants 
in the Southern District of California, 1 of 10 in the Districts of 
  
 105 The Sentencing Commission began reporting 5k3.1 (fast-track) motions in 
the post-Booker data in 2005. See 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 
15. Before these reports, the Sentencing Commission reported “other government 
downward departures.” See 2002 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15. 
These other motions for 2004, after Congressional authorization of fast-track programs, 
likely include 5k3.1 motions. Data reported before Congressional authorization also 
likely includes downward departures due to ad hoc fast-track programs. However, since 
these motions are reported within the general category of “other downward 
departures,” this note does not incorporate the data for those years into analysis of 
fast-track disparities.  
 106 Other scholars have recently discussed fast-track programs as both a 
statistical factor and a policy factor in sentencing disparities. Most analysis of 
disparities related to fast-track sentencing programs relates to disparities between 
fast-track and non-fast-track districts. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 145-46; Abe 
Cho, Lowering Sentences for Illegal Immigrants: Why Judges Should Have Discretion to 
Vary from the Guidelines Based on Fast-Track Sentencing Disparities, 43 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 447 (2010). However, this note will look for disparities within the five 
border districts, all authorized for fast-track programs in similar offenses. 
 107 Although only the post-Booker sentencing data reports specifically on 5k3.1 
departures (and the pre-Booker data does not), the percentages from the post-Booker 
reporting are useful to represent the year 2005 figures for several reasons. First, the 
pre-Booker reporting data is a smaller fraction of the year total data (it represents 
October 1, 2004 to January 11, 2005). Second, the percent of 5k3.1 motions given in the 
post-Booker period is, with the exception of Southern California, consistent with the 
following year’s rates of 5k3.1 departures. Third, the category where 5k3.1 departures 
were reported in the pre-Booker data, “Other Government Downward Departures,” is 
very similar in size to the percent in the post-Booker data. 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15, at introduction. Moreover, 5k3.1 departures were the 
primary kind of departures recorded in this category. Finally, and most importantly, 
the decision in Booker did not directly change the ability of prosecutors to make 5k3.1 
motions, and so should not directly impact the rate at which they were made. See id. 
(discussing the reason for separating the 2005 data, and characterizing the most 
significant change post-Booker as being that judges were instructed to merely consider 
the statutory guidelines, rather than considering them mandatory). Therefore, the 
post-Booker 2005 data used to indicate 2005 levels is a number useful for general 
discussion of larger disparities. 
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New Mexico and Southern Texas, and only 3 of 100 in the 
Western District of Texas.108 
 
Not only are there significant disparities between the 
border districts in the use of fast-track motions, but also the 
disparities likely cause significant variations in sentences of 
similar offenders across districts. In 2002, Linda Drazga 
Maxfield, former Acting Director of the Office of Policy Analysis 
at the Sentencing Commission, undertook a detailed 
examination of federal practices involving unlawful entry, the 
most common federal immigration offense, across the five 
border districts.109 Her analysis concluded that, even controlling 
for differences in criminal history, unlawful reentry offenders 
with prior aggravated felony convictions received disparate 
sentences in the five districts in 1997.110 Maxfield identified 
“differential charging and plea practices across districts” as the 
source of the disparities.111 
Although fast-track programs had not been officially 
authorized at the time of Maxfield’s analysis, she noted their 
  
 108 The District of Arizona reported fast-track motions for more than 50% of 
all sentenced cases in the district. The other districts all had rates at or below 40% for 
each of the years. The Western District of Texas, the district with the lowest rate of 
5k3.1 departures, had consistently less than 5% of defendants receiving 5k3.1 motions. 
2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15. 
 109 Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry, 
supra note 8, at 260. 
 110 Id. at 263-65. 
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ad hoc existence and contribution to the disparities.112 Maxfield 
found that all of the districts were granting downward 
departures, of which 9 out of 10 required offenders to accept 
voluntary deportation (and waive a formal deportation 
hearing).113 However, the districts varied widely in how many of 
these downward departures were being given—in the District 
of Arizona downward departures were given to 97% of unlawful 
entry offenders, while in the Southern District of California 
they were given to only 14.2%.114 
The use of fast-track motions after Maxfield’s study 
underscores the impact of the local variation. In 2005, all five 
border districts were authorized for fast-track programs for the 
two most prosecuted immigration offenses (illegal reentry and 
improper entry).115 However, as discussed above, the districts 
had widely disparate use of the fast-track programs. Based on 
the data, it appears that some of the border districts continued 
to use the fast-track charge bargaining Maxfield noted, rather 
than fast-track motions, to process the high volumes of 
immigration offenders. 
Interestingly, the disparities in use of fast-track motions 
do not correspond to comparatively reduced sentences. 
Although the District of Arizona had the highest rate of fast-
track motions (by far) in the years 2005-2008, it also had the 
highest median immigration sentence of the border districts in 
each of those same years.116 The Western District of Texas, the 
district with the lowest rate of fast-track motions, had median 
immigration sentences for the years 2005-2008 very close to the 
average of the median immigration sentences over the five 
districts.117 Although this is a small sample set, it is clear that 
increased rates of fast-track motions do not necessarily cause 
lower median immigration sentences, and decreased rates of 
fast-track motions do not necessarily cause higher median 
immigration sentences. 
  
 112 Id. at 263. Maxfield noted that downward departures were the most 
common reason for the differences in sentence length, but did not alone explain the 
sentencing patterns. Id. 
 113 Id. at 262-63. 
 114 Id. at 262. 
 115 See supra Parts I.B, II.B. 
 116 For the years 2005-2008, the District of Arizona had median immigration 
sentences of 26, 26, 21, and 23, respectively. SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 2005-
2008, supra note 15. The average median of the five districts for those years was 18, 18, 
16, and 14, respectively. Id. 
 117 For the years 2005-2008, the Western District of Texas had median 
immigration sentences of 18, 18, 18, and 10, respectively. Id. 
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Although fast-track motions have only been officially 
used and tracked for the last several years, the data available 
shows a clear disparity in how the border districts use fast-
track motions. The next section will suggest and analyze 
possible sources for the disparity. 
B. Step 2: Possible Sources of the Disparities 
There are several possible reasons for the disparities in 
rates of fast-track motions. A logical reason for the disparities 
is the fact that certain districts are authorized for fast-track 
programs in more offense categories than are other districts or 
divisions. A second possibility is that some districts simply 
process higher volumes of defendants who are eligible for fast-
track programs. Another reason is that charge bargaining—the 
practice of prosecutors bargaining for pleas using variations in 
what crime to charge in the first place, rather than what 
sentence to ask for—plays a large role in some districts and a 
lesser role (or no role) in others. 
One reason for the differences in the use of fast-track 
motions could be differences in the fast-track programs for 
which each district received authorization. In order to use fast-
track departures, a district must be authorized for a fast-track 
program for the charged offenses.118 The Justice Department 
authorized the District of Arizona for two more fast-track 
programs than the other districts, meaning that the District of 
Arizona could use fast-track departures for two more offense 
types than the other districts.119 
However, the District of Arizona used more fast-track 
departures than the other districts by a substantial margin. 
Moreover, the District of Arizona was not authorized for “drug 
offenses along the border,” an authorization received by the 
Southern District of California, Western District of Texas (in 
2004), and the Laredo Division of the Southern District of 
Texas.120 Although differing authorization for fast-track 
procedures could contribute to some variation among the five 
districts, the wide disparity between the District of Arizona 
  
 118 See supra Part I.B. 
 119 See supra Part I.B. New Mexico was also authorized for drug backpacking. 
Comey Memo, supra note 78. 
 120 Filing by the United States in United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 
2d 943 (2005), reprinted in 21 FED. SENT. REP. 339, 339-40, 342-43, 347-48 (2009). 
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(with consistent rates over 50%)121 and Western District of 
Texas (with consistent rates under 10%)122 rates of fast-track 
motions seems too substantial to be attributed fully to differing 
district authorization.  
A second reason for the disparity could be that higher-
rate districts simply process more fast-track-eligible 
defendants. Illegal reentry, the offense for which fast-track is 
“the norm,”123 is a frequent offense in each of the border 
districts. Logically, comparing the proportion of illegal reentry 
offenses on the dockets of the highest and lowest rate fast-track 
motion districts should show correspondingly high or low 
proportions of illegal reentry offenders, or significant levels of 
fast-track offenses that explain the disparity. 
In 2005, 53% of offenders in the District of Arizona 
received fast-track departures, and only 4% did in the Western 
District of Texas.124 In that same year, just under a quarter of 
Arizona’s docket involved illegal reentry cases.125 Similarly, the 
Western District of Texas’s docket was just under 24% illegal 
reentry cases.126 In other words, each district had roughly the 
same proportion of illegal reentry cases on its criminal docket, 
but the districts had widely disparate rates of fast-track 
motions. Therefore, the proportion of illegal reentry offenders 
on the districts’ dockets does not account for the disparate use 
of fast-track motions. 
The explanation for the disparity that seems most in 
line with the evidence is differing practices or policies employed 
by the respective U.S. Attorney’s offices in the border districts. 
Maxfield theorized that much of the disparity she found in 
  
 121 See supra Figure 1. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Gorman, supra note 9, at 314. 
 124 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15. 
 125 According to Sentencing Commission data, in 2005, 50.3% of Arizona’s 
docket was immigration offenders. 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 
15. According to TRAC, just under 50% of the immigration offenders Arizona processed 
were illegal reentry offenders. Immigration Convictions by Lead Charge, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (2005), http://trac.syr.edu/tracins/ 
findings/05/criminal/district/arizona/arizonaglaw05.html. Although the Sentencing 
Commission and TRAC collect their data from different sources, the percents are useful 
for highly generalized comparison. 
 126 According to Sentencing Commission data, in 2005, 43.9% of the Western 
District of Texas’s docket was immigration offenders. 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N 
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15. Of the immigration offenders, TRAC data shows that just 
under 60% were illegal reentry. Immigration Convictions by Lead Charge, supra note 
125. Therefore, loosely calculated, approximately 26% of Texas West’s docket was 
illegal reentry offenders.  
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sentences stemmed from differing charge bargaining 
practices.127 Under the mandatory regime, the Guidelines 
themselves were, as Kate Stith observed, “powerful bargaining 
chips for prosecutors.”128 Even without the mandatory 
framework, prosecutors still have “broad charging discretion.”129 
Charge bargaining is an example of one way in which different 
prosecutors’ offices could collectively—through official or 
unofficial office policy—use their discretion to employ differing 
means to deal with the same fast-track eligible offenders. 
The type of charge bargaining Maxfield noted is the 
practice where the prosecutor allows the defendant to plead to 
a lesser crime in exchange for the defendant’s early disposition 
of the case. For example, a prosecutor might allow a defendant 
to plead to reentry of an illegal alien130—carrying a fine and 
two-year maximum imprisonment, or both, rather than reentry 
of an illegal alien convicted of a crime or previously 
deported131—carrying a fine and ten-year maximum. In a 
hypothetical charge bargaining scenario, there is no need for a 
motion to lower the sentence because the defendant has 
pleaded to a lesser crime.132 Therefore, prosecutors in the 
Western District of Texas could be using charge bargaining to 
process offenders more quickly, but not be making fast-track 
motions. Under this scenario, prosecutors in the District of 
Arizona might hypothetically be more likely to charge the 
higher offense, yet make a fast-track motion so that the 
sentencing court makes a departure for early disposition. 
The comparison between the Western District of Texas 
and the District of Arizona reinforces the inference from the 
districts’ disparate use of fast-track motions that districts 
processing the same high proportion of fast-track eligible 
offenders are not processing those offenders in the same way. 
The comparison suggests that some districts might be achieving 
the effects of a fast-track motion (an ultimately lowered 
sentence) without actually making the fast-track motion. 
  
 127 Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry, 
supra note 8, at 263-65. 
 128 Stith, supra note 88, at 1444. 
 129 Id. at 1423. 
 130 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2008). 
 131 Id. § 1326(b). 
 132 Charge bargaining essentially mimics the ad hoc programs of the mid-
1990s, Gorman, supra note 9, at 312-13, and is allowed by the Attorney General, 
subject to several qualifications and restrictions. See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 74. 
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In sum, differences in fast-track authorization and 
volume of fast-track-eligible offenders may play a part in the 
disparate use of fast-track motions in the border districts. 
However, charge bargaining by prosecutors is a more likely 
source of much of the disparity. 
C. Step 3: Different Districts, Unjustifiably Different Systems 
Differing prosecutorial strategies for dealing with the 
large numbers of immigration-related offenders could be 
strategic decisions or merely “local culture”—habits that 
developed over time into accepted practice. Professor Bibas 
accepted—and even lauded—local practices developed as 
tactical responses to local crime problems.133 He acknowledged, 
for example, that “a sudden rash of shootings . . . may require a 
swift and severe response.”134 Moreover, local law enforcement 
agents and prosecutors may have local knowledge about how 
some crimes are being committed.135 
However, according to Bibas, local variations lacking 
such particular justifications can carry significant costs.136 
Indeed, unjustified variations “make the law seem arbitrary, 
undercutting its perceived fairness and legitimacy.”137 Bibas 
identifies disparities due to federal district policy 
disagreements as unjustified and especially troubling because 
of the federal system’s aim to “address national problems and 
enforce them with one voice.”138 Bibas’ concern seems especially 
pertinent to the border districts, where all five districts work to 
implement national policy goals relating to one overarching 
localized crime problem. 
Congress created official fast-track programs in order to 
limit unchecked discretion in the sentencing process.139 As 
several scholars point out, the aim of the amendments officially 
creating fast-track motions was to allow for closer tracking of 
downward departures for purposes of monitoring both judicial 
and prosecutorial discretion.140 A sentence resulting from a 
  
 133 Bibas, supra note 8, at 141. 
 134 Id. at 139. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 140. 
 139 See supra Part I.B. 
 140 See, e.g., Gorman, Rereading Congressional Intent, supra note 68, at 5-6; 
Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 8-9. 
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charge bargain is reflected in the sentencing data as a “within 
Guidelines” sentence and the actual reasons for the lower 
sentence go unreported,141 thus defeating the Congressional goal 
of tracking (and monitoring) district sentencing practices 
through the Sentencing Commission’s data collection. 
Allowing the discretion of prosecutors, who decide 
whether to “charge bargain” in each individual case, to go 
unmonitored arguably does more damage than simply defeat 
Congressional goals. If, as the data suggests, some districts are 
using a reported method and some are using an unreported 
method, efforts to track use of fast-track motions to note 
disparities or changing trends are much less effective. 
Therefore, prosecutorial plea bargain practices related to fast-
track programs go unmonitored.142 The disparity in use of fast-
track motions is troubling because it reveals that border 
districts are likely using very different systems for sentencing 
similar offenders.143 
III. ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE DEPARTURES 
Although fast-track programs may be a recent “hot-spot” 
in sentencing, substantial assistance motions and the related 
sentencing disparities are a much-discussed144 aspect of the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines. This Part analyzes 
substantial assistance departures in the border districts in 
1996-2008. The first section analyzes the rates of substantial 
  
 141 The lack of reporting is due to the fact that a charge bargain, by its very 
nature, occurs in the “administrative criminal process” between the prosecutor and the 
offender, rather than in the courts. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity 
in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1411-12 (2003). In a charge bargaining 
scenario, negotiations are not only left out of relevant sentencing data, but are also 
completely shielded from public or judicial review. See id. (discussing lack of 
transparency in charge bargaining and its implications for the sound administration of 
criminal justice). 
 142 Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons 
from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 871 (2008) (“[T]here are currently no 
effective legal checks in place to police the manner in which prosecutors exercise their 
discretion to bring charges, to negotiate pleas, or to set their office policies.”). 
 143 The indication that districts using fast-track programs are using them 
disparately is even more troubling in light of the alleged disparities between districts 
using the program and districts that are not. Defendants in several districts have 
alleged a constitutional violation because they were not offered participation in a fast-
track program. See Berman, supra note 101; Gorman, Rereading Congressional Intent, 
supra note 74, at 2-3 (describing a circuit split on whether the lack of a fast-track 
program and the related disparity in applicable sentence can be taken into account at a 
defendant’s sentencing).  
 144 See Baer, supra note 52, at 7-8 (describing different themes of criticizing 
cooperation within the United States Sentencing Guidelines). 
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assistance departures and reveals that, while disparities 
existed in the past, the border districts are currently using 
substantial assistance departures at similarly low rates. The 
second section identifies several explanations for the 
sentencing patterns, including characteristics of immigration 
offenses that make them less likely to involve substantial 
assistance motions. The third section concludes that the 
substantial assistance patterns indicate that the border 
districts are dealing similarly with their shared experiences, 
although they may be sacrificing cooperation in the process.  
A. Step 1: From Disparity to “Uniformity” 
The Sentencing Commission data on substantial 
assistance departures reflects the number of sentences where 
the judge made a downward departure in sentencing after a 
government substantial assistance motion.145 Nationally, 
district-level data shows wide disparity in the number and 
proportion of substantial assistance motions given to 
defendants in the federal districts.146 These national disparities 
have been the source of significant scholarly criticism.147 
Although districts can also have disparate practices in the 
extent of departure recommended within the substantial 
assistance motions,148 this analysis concerns only the 
percentage of total offenders receiving substantial assistance 
motions—not possible disparities in the resulting sentences. 
In recent years the border districts have converged 
around a trend of substantial assistance rates notably lower 
than the national rate. Although in the 1990s the border 
districts used substantial assistance motions at disparate 
rates, the districts have gradually converged around relatively 
  
 145 This type of departure is allowed only upon a government motion, 
Maxfield, EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK, supra note 8, at 2 n.6, indicating that the defendant 
has provided “assistance to authorities in the investigation of criminal activities.” Id. at 
3. Therefore, the rate at which sentencing courts depart for substantial assistance is 
essentially the same as the rate at which prosecutors make substantial assistance 
motions. Whether or not to make a motion is a unilateral government decision, not 
subject to judicial review except for constitutional violations. Id. Therefore, discussion 
of whether a defendant “received” a substantial assistance motion refers to the fact 
that the government made such a motion and the judge incorporated it into the 
defendant’s sentence. 
 146 Simons, supra note 95, at 948. 
 147 Baer, supra note 52, at 7. In fact, these disparities have been used as 
evidence of improper prosecutorial discretion, Simons, supra note 95, at 924, and as an 
indication of improper congressional policy choices, Bibas, supra note 8, at 138. 
 148 Bibas, supra note 8, at 149-50. 
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similar rates.149 Figure 2, plotting the rates of substantial 
assistance in the border districts over the years 1996-2008, 
illustrates this trend. The differing rates show that in 1996, 1 
in 5 defendants in the Southern District of Texas received a 
substantial assistance motion, but only 1 in 10 defendants 
received such a motion in each of the districts of New Mexico, 
Southern District of California, and Arizona.150 However, since 
2004, all five border districts have had rates of substantial 
assistance motions between roughly 3-10%.151 These recent 
rates in the individual border districts are lower than the 
national rates of substantial assistance motions, which 
remained around 13-15% in the years 2004-2008.152 
 
  
 149 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15.  
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. Although rates of substantial assistance departures were slightly more 
disparate in 2004 than in 2005, the overall substantial assistance trends in the border 
districts do not appear to have been impacted by the changes in applicability of the 
federal sentencing guidelines. In 2004, the substantial assistance rates of the districts 
ranged between 3.8% and 10.4%. 2004 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 
15. In 2005, they ranged from 3.3% to 7.7%. Id. 
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B. Step 2: A Downward Uniform Trend 
The low (and dropping) rates of substantial assistance in 
the border districts correlate to high (and rising) numbers of 
immigration cases on the district dockets. This correlation can 
be explained in several ways. First, it can be explained by 
characteristics of immigration offenders and of the immigration 
offenses themselves. Second, it can be explained by immigration 
offenders’ high rates of participation in fast-track programs. 
Statistical analysis reveals a fairly strong correlation 
between the number of immigration cases sentenced in a 
district and the number of downward departures based on 
substantial assistance motions. Figure 3 shows a linear 
regression of the percentage immigration offenses on a 
district’s docket per year, and the percentage of cases receiving 
substantial assistance motions.153 Each data point on the 
regression is a district in a given year. Figure 3 shows that, 
generally speaking,154 as the percent of the docket composed of 
immigration offenders increases (on the x axis), the percent of 
offenders receiving substantial assistance motions (on the y 
axis) goes down. Although this correlation does not prove 
causation between the two occurrences, it shows that there is a 
fairly strong relationship between how much of a district’s 
docket is immigration crimes and how many substantial 
assistance motions that district’s prosecutors make per year.155 
 
  
 153 This linear regression has a negative slope. This shows a “negative 
correlation,” or a tendency for large values of y to go with small values of x, and small 
values of y to go with high values of x. FREUND, supra note 94, at 501. 
 154 Typical linear regression analysis assumes that the independent variables 
will be normally distributed, or sharing an error distribution around a mean point. 
Testing the Assumptions of Linear Regression, DUKE.EDU, http://www.duke.edu/ 
~rnau/testing.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). In this case, the independent variables 
are themselves proportions (percentages). Lack of normal distribution can compromise 
the estimation of coefficients, such as the correlation coefficient discussed herein. Id. 
However, because this analysis does not involve the calculation of a correlation 
coefficient, but merely the illustration of a generalized correlation trend, this note’s 
analysis proceeds without normally distributed independent variables. 
 155 Linear regression of the overall U.S. data 1996-2008 reveals a correlation 
of R2=0.9 between the percent immigration offenders of total U.S. offenders and the 
percent of offenders receiving a substantial assistance motion, a very high statistical 
correlation. In other words, as the proportion of immigration offenders in the United 
States rose, the proportion of offenders receiving substantial assistance motions 
declined. However, the use of only 12 data points (the 12 years) suggests that this 
correlation is useful, but may overemphasize the correlation that would exist if all of 
the district data points (each U.S. district by year) were included in the regression.  
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Close examination of data from one particular district, 
the Southern District of Texas, supports this correlation. The 
district had noticeably higher rates of substantial assistance 
than the other districts in the years 1996-2002.156 However, the 
steady decline in rate of substantial assistance motions in the 
district over that period corresponds to a rise in the proportion 
of immigration offenses on the district’s docket.157 
There are several qualities of an immigration offense 
that explain why defendants in immigration cases do not often 
receive substantial assistance motions. Cooperation aids 
prosecutors and law enforcement officials in the detection of 
other crimes or co-conspirators in a defendant’s crime.158 Unlike 
drug trafficking offenses, which “by their very nature, involve 
chains of accomplices, associates, and co-conspirators,”159 
immigration offenders may be less likely to have co-
conspirators to testify against. 
  
 156 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15. 
 157 In 1996, the Southern District of Texas’s docket was 50% drug trafficking 
cases, and, in 2002, declined to just under 40%. Id. By 2008, the proportion of drug 
trafficking offenders on the district’s docket had decreased to 18%. Id. The decrease in 
proportion of drug trafficking offenses is due to the increase in immigration offenses. In 
1996, the district’s docket was 27% immigration offenders; by 2002 it was 42%. Id. This 
proportion rose fairly steadily (evening out for the years 2005-2007 around 65%), 
reaching 72% in 2008. Id. 
 158 Baer, supra note 52, at 12-15. 
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Another reason immigration offenders might not 
cooperate is that prosecutors are generally without authority to 
offer them temporary deportation immunity, even if they are 
cooperating witnesses.160 Therefore, immigration offenders will 
have little incentive to cooperate because they will potentially 
gain little from any bargain. Moreover, knowing that this 
restriction exists might potentially chill prosecutors from 
pursuing potential cooperators in the first place. 
Increased use of fast-track programs is another reason 
for the decrease in substantial assistance motions in each 
district. Use and official sanction of fast-track motions161 
increased during the same period as the decline of substantial 
assistance motions. Although the corresponding timeframe does 
not definitively show causation, characteristics of fast-track 
sentencing support the argument for at least some correlation 
between the two trends. For example, fast-track deals usually 
preclude substantial assistance cooperation because they rely on 
“the premise that a defendant who promptly agrees to 
participate in [fast-track sentencing] has saved the government 
significant and scarce resources that can be used in prosecuting 
other defendants.”162 Fast-track disposition is a somewhat 
“truncated procedure,”163 resulting in fast wholesale processing of 
cases, rather than case-by-case prosecutorial discretion.164 
Although this does not summarily preclude the possibility of 
substantial assistance, it would logically seem to make it less 
likely that the prosecutor would have the time to engage in the 
process of evaluating a defendant’s potential for substantial 
assistance and taking a proffer. 
  
 160 28 C.F.R. § 0.197 (2007) (“The Immigration and Naturalization Service 
(Service) shall not be bound . . . through plea agreements, cooperation agreements, or 
other agreements with or for the benefit of alien defendants, witnesses, or informants, 
or other aliens cooperating with the United States Government, except by the 
authorization of the Commissioner of the Service or the Commissioner’s delegate.”); see 
also Rachel Frankel, Note, Sharks and Minnows: Using Temporary Alien Deportation 
Immunity to Catch the Big Fish, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431, 433 (2009). Although 
Frankel argues that this regulation de-incentivizes cooperation by lawful permanent 
residents charged with minor crimes, id. at 432, the illustration of her argument (and 
many of her subsequent arguments) focuses on cooperation related to crimes other than 
immigration crimes, id. at 431.  
 161 See supra Part I.A. 
 162 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All 
U.S. Attorneys on Department Principles for Implementing an Expedited Disposition 
or “Fast Track” Prosecution Program in a District (Sept. 22, 2003). 
 163 Bibas, supra note 8, at 146. 
 164 Id. 
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C. Step 3: Low Rates as a Justified Trend 
Although the border district data shows converging 
rates of substantial assistance departures and a correlation 
between the rates of substantial assistance and the proportion 
of immigration offenders on the district dockets, the dockets of 
the border districts are not composed of the same proportions of 
immigration cases. In theory, the correlation between 
immigration offenders and lowered rates of substantial 
assistance motions should suggest that a district with lower 
rates of immigration offenders would have higher rates of 
substantial assistance motions. However, because the districts 
have different proportions of immigration cases on their 
dockets, it is more likely the factors associated with 
immigration offenders, such as citizenship of offenders and the 
districts’ increasing caseloads, correlate most directly to the 
decrease in substantial assistance rates. 
For example, the Western District of Texas has a low 
proportion of immigration cases on its docket in relation to the 
other border districts, but has similar rates of substantial 
assistance departures. In 2005, the Western District of Texas’s 
docket was only 43% immigration offenders, and it gave 7.7% of 
offenders a substantial assistance motion.165 The district had 
the highest rate of substantial assistance in the five border 
districts, but it could be argued that, given the relatively low 
proportion of immigration offenses on its caseload,166 the 
percent of substantial assistance motions should have been 
higher. However, the district had a comparatively high 
proportion of drug trafficking offenders on its docket—41%, as 
compared to between 20-30% in the other border districts.167 
Given that drug trafficking is usually a “high-cooperation 
crime,” this difference suggests that the Western District of 
Texas has a disproportionately infrequent use of substantial 
assistance motions as compared to the other four districts. 
However, as discussed above, the citizenship of offenders 
on a district’s docket can have a great impact on the rates of 
substantial assistance motions.168 Moreover, the decreased use of 
  
 165 2005 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOK, supra note 15. 
 166 In 2005, New Mexico had a caseload of 63.5% immigration offenders, and 
the Southern District of Texas had a caseload of 67.2%. The other two districts were 
also above 50%. Id. 
 167 SENTENCING COMM’N SOURCEBOOKS 1996-2008, supra note 15. 
 168 See supra Part III.B. 
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substantial assistance motions came at roughly the same time 
as the overall increase in each district’s criminal docket. Both 
factors—non-citizenship of offenders and increased caseloads—
likely relate to the lowered rates in the districts.  
This trend seems in line with the sort of response to 
“localized crime problems” Professor Bibas deems 
presumptively justifiable.169 The fact that the districts are all 
being influenced by the factors they are experiencing—large 
volume of non-citizen offenders, immigration offenders, 
increase in criminal defendants—indicates that this trend is 
not based on district-level policy disagreements. In other 
words, this downward trend does not implicate the unfettered 
or arbitrary prosecutorial discretion Bibas condemns.170 This 
trend does indicate, however, that prosecutors’ “self-interest in 
disposing of cases quickly”171 may be causing the border districts 
to make less frequent use of cooperators. 
CONCLUSION 
This note undertakes an admittedly generalized 
analysis172 of the border districts’ sentencing practices. 
However, the data reveals two very interesting general trends: 
the districts are experiencing different rates of fast-track 
motions and low rates of substantial assistance motions. The 
rise of immigration offenders in the districts can be linked to 
both of these trends: the sharp increase of immigration 
offenders—leading to hefty increases in the overall dockets—
led the districts to adopt different mechanisms for processing 
the high volumes of criminal defendants, and also led to overall 
lowered rates of substantial assistance motions.  
Fast-track programs are justified by supporters as 
programs borne of the necessity to deal with increasing 
volumes of immigration offenders. This note’s analyses reveal 
this justification to be based on fact. As discussed in Part I.A., 
  
 169 Bibas, supra note 8, at 141; see also supra Part I.C. 
 170 Bibas, supra note 8, at 151. 
 171 Id. 
 172 This note’s analyses did not control for other sentencing factors such as 
criminal history, or offender characteristics, such as age, method of disposition, or race. 
For a description of a process for analyzing downward departures by creating “dummy” 
models to control for those variables, see Schanzenbach, supra note 8, at 17-19; see also 
Maxfield & Burchfield, Immigration Offenses Involving Unlawful Entry, supra note 8, 
at 261-62 (controlling for Criminal History Category in analyzing border district 
sentencing practices on unlawful entry immigration offenses). 
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the border districts have growing dockets, largely due to 
notable increases in the number and proportion of immigration 
offenders. However, another way to look at the justification for 
fast-track programs is one of priorities: border districts 
processing a high volume of cases can boast of “high stats” and 
perhaps assuage public outcry for increased border security.173 
However, this note’s analysis suggests that focusing on high-
volume processing may lead to less cooperation and disparate 
fast-track practices. In other words, the border districts may be 
“throwing the baby out with the bathwater”—that is, working 
toward goals of high-volume, speedy dockets rather than 
effective law enforcement or fair sentencing practices. 
The sentencing data from the border districts hardly 
shows disparities akin to vigilante justice meted out by sheriffs 
or gunslingers. Although the districts are using some 
sentencing mechanisms differently, they are united by the 
effort to deal with the high volume of offenders on their 
criminal dockets. However, examination of sentencing trends in 
the border districts shows that the chaotic violence in the 
border districts, reminiscent of the “Old West,” has played out 
in federal sentences and should be a closely monitored aspect of 
federal efforts in the border states. 
Sarah C. White† 
  
 173 Apollonio et al., supra note 23, at 6. 
 † J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011; B.A., University of Chicago, 
2005. I would like to thank Professor Miriam Baer for her expertise and advice, and 
Professor Edward Cheng for his consultation on the statistical aspects of this note. I 
am grateful to the staff of the Brooklyn Law Review and my inspiring colleagues. A 
special note of thanks to my family and friends for their love and support. 
